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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the age of nineteen, Miasha Thomas bought her first house 
in Saint Paul, Minnesota.1
 
       †  The author is a 2009 J.D. candidate at William Mitchell College of Law; 
B.A., Journalism and Mass Communications, University of Minnesota, 2001. He 
thanks his parents, Marcia and Nicholas Hayes, for their support and assistance 
when he decided to pursue a law degree, and the William Mitchell Law Review staff 
for their tireless efforts. 
 1. Ron Nixon et al., Borrowing Trouble: A Star Tribune Special Report: Costly 
Loans Turn Payday Into Debt Day, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 15, 2004, at 1A. 
  Her earnings from a mail-sorting job 
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barely covered her mortgage and modest living expenses.2  Without 
warning, one day she lost her job.3  What she thought would be a 
temporary setback extended into a long-term struggle to make ends 
meet.4  So, one day, she gave into temptation and walked into a 
store with a yellow sign advertising payday loans.5  She asked for a 
$250 loan against her next paycheck.6  To qualify for the loan, 
Thomas only needed an I.D., confirmation of a job, and a checking 
account.7  The lender charged her $22.50 in fees and interest—
equivalent to a 469% annual percentage rate.8
Thomas returned a few weeks later to borrow $350 and a week 
later another $350, and yet another $350.
 
9  She persuaded her 
parents to take out payday loans for her.10  During a three-year 
period, Thomas incurred more than $2,100 in fees.11  Exorbitant 
fees and interest rates eventually forced her to sell her home.12
Payday lenders promise a lifeline but are actually a noose 
around the neck for Thomas and thousands of Minnesota’s low-
income residents.
 
13  A number of financial businesses have profited 
during the past decade by targeting low-income populations who 
struggle from paycheck to paycheck to make ends meet and have 
been denied access to mainstream financial institutions.14  
Deregulation spawned the growth of these industries that prey 
upon the increased number of people with bad credit, rising levels 
of personal debt, and a growing immigrant population.15  Payday 
lending is not only the fastest growing industry in the finance 
sector,16 it is one of the fastest growing industries in America.17
This article outlines the problems associated with payday 
lending and Minnesota’s attempt to regulate the industry, and then 
 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Lisa Blaylock Moss, Commentary, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred 
Presentment Transactions & the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1731 (2000). 
2
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recommends ways Minnesota can strengthen its regulation of the 
industry and how other measures could prevent abusive payday 
lending.  Part II discusses the payday loans in detail.  Part II.A 
discusses the characteristics of payday loans and the industry’s 
expansion in the United States.  Part II.B examines the 
demographics of a payday loan consumer.  Part II.C discusses the 
troublesome features of payday loans.  Part II involves a lengthy, 
but essential discussion regarding the payday lending industries.  
This extended discussion complements an intention to underscore 
the predatory nature of the payday loan industry and the need for 
reform.  Part III describes Minnesota’s attempt to regulate the 
payday lending industry and its shortcomings.  Part IV proposes 
ways to curb the abusive payday loan practices.  Part IV.A specifies 
ways to strengthen the current Minnesota Small Loan Consumer 
Statute.  Part IV.B details another method for preventing unfair 
payday lending practices through litigation.  Finally, Part IV.C 
identifies ways in which banks and credit unions could provide 
affordable, yet profitable, alternatives to payday loans. 
II. PAYDAY LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Characteristics of a Payday Loan and the Industry’s Expansion in the 
United States 
1. The Characteristics of Payday Loans 
Payday lending is a component of the “alternative financial 
services” or “fringe banking” industry in the United States.18  Many 
traditional loan providers abandoned the risky small-loan industry 
in favor of more profitable, larger loans, which had benefited from 
the deregulation of the banking industry and elimination of 
interest rate caps in the 1980s.19  The fringe-banking industry filled 
the vacuum by promoting alternative financial services to 
consumers with poor credit ratings or low to moderate incomes.20
 
 18. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial 
Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking 
About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 591 (2000). 
 19. Moss, supra note 17, at 1732.  See generally Christopher L. Peterson, Usury 
Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit 
Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110 (2008) (discussing how state and federal 
deregulation paved the way for payday lending). 
 20. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 591. 
  
Payday lending comprises an important part of the fringe-banking 
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industry by issuing small loans to high-risk consumers who lack 
access to mainstream financial institutions.21  The loans are 
available at gas stations, pawn shops, convenience stores, ATMs, the 
Internet, and traditional payday loan stores.22
A payday lender makes short-term cash loans.
   
23  Generally, the 
payday loans have two-week terms and are for less than $1,000.24  In 
states that specifically permit payday lending, allowable loan 
amounts range from $300 to $1,000, with a common cap of $500.25  
To get a payday loan, a consumer typically gives the payday lender a 
postdated check that includes the payday lender’s fee.26  The 
payday lender advances the amount of the check, excluding the fee 
in cash.27  Other transactions use delayed automatic debit 
agreements as opposed to postdated checks.28  The payday lender 
agrees to defer the deposit of the check or the automatic debit for 
an agreed-upon time, which generally is tied to coincide with the 
consumer’s next payday, or sometimes for a period of time for up 
to a month.29  The application process is highly streamlined, 
requires minimal credit criteria, and provides cash immediately.30
The process follows a typical pattern.  The consumer gives a 
payday lender a $115 check ($100 for the loan amount and $15 for 
the fee).
 
31  The consumer then receives $100 in cash.32
 
 21. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002). 
 22. STATE PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUPS & CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., SHOW 
ME THE MONEY!: A SURVEY OF PAYDAY LENDERS AND REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDER 
LOBBYING IN STATE LEGISLATURES 1 (2000), http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/0J/
JI/0JJIxjolTQlIpsOOhaP_dg/showmethemoneyfinal.PDF [hereinafter SHOW ME 
THE MONEY!]. 
 23. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 600. 
 24. Id. at 602. 
 25. Since 1997, the Consumer Federation of America, which monitors the 
payday lending industry, has published annual reports that include surveys of state 
laws applicable to payday lending.  CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., SMALL DOLLAR LOAN 
PRODUCTS SCORECARD: STATUTORY BACKUP (2008), http://www.consumerfed.org/ 
pdfs/statutory_backup_08.pdf. 
 26. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 600–01. 
 27. Id. at 601. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. SHEILA BAIR, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., LOW-COST PAYDAY LOANS: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 6 (2005), http://www.aecf.org/upload/ 
publicationfiles/fes3622h334.pdf. 
 31. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 601. 
  When the 
 32. Id.  To qualify for a payday loan at an UnBank, a Minnesota payday 
lender, a consumer must be a Minnesota resident, eighteen years of age or older, 
and must have a proof of a current checking account (minimum of three months 
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payday loan comes due, the consumer can give the payday lender 
$115 in cash or a money order to redeem the check and prevent 
the automatic debit, or the consumer can let the payday lender 
deposit the check or debit the account.33
2. The Expansion of the Payday Lending Industry in America 
 
Payday lending began in 1993 in the United States when 
Check Into Cash, Inc. opened its first store in Tennessee.34  The 
industry developed by exploiting the loopholes in usury laws that 
set ceilings on the rates charged for loans.35  The industry 
promoted itself as a less costly and more desirable alternative to 
bank charges for insufficient fees, late charges on credit cards, or 
utility reconnect fees.36  The industry maintained that it was not a 
loan but instead a form of check-cashing services or sale of a 
check.37  Even if it was a loan, the industry maintained that small 
loan laws exempted the industry from state usury laws.38  The 
industry grew as regulators and state legislatures sought ways to 
deal with reports of high-cost credit.39  According to some reports, 
by May 2005 payday loan stores outnumbered McDonald’s 
restaurants nationwide.40
By 2005, there were roughly 23,000 to 25,000 payday lenders 





old), a checkbook, a current photo I.D., and a home phone number.  UnBank, 
http://www.unloan.com/HowItWorks.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2009). 
 33. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 601. 
 34. Scott Andrew Schaaf, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday 
Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 339 nn.3–4 (2001).  Based in Cleveland, 
Tennessee, Check Into Cash, Inc. opened its first outlet in 1993 and as of 2001 had 
more than three-hundred outlets in fifteen states.  Id. at 339 n.4 (citing JERRY L. 
ROBINSON, STEPHENS INC., PAYDAY ADVANCE–THE FINAL INNINGS: STANDARDIZING THE 
APPROACH 3, 4 (Sept. 22, 2000)). 
 35. Mary Spector, Taming the Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and 
Unintended Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 964 (2008). 
  The industry’s growth is driven by its immense 
 36. Cmty Fin. Servs. of Am., Payday Advance: Fact vs. Fiction, 
http://www.cfsa.net/fact_vs_fiction.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).   
 37. Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1380–81 (S.D. 
Ga. 2000). 
 38. Spector, supra note 35, at 974. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See 60 Minutes II: Paying More for Payday Loans (CBS television broadcast 
May 18, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/ 
16/60II/main695461.shtml). 
 41. Consumer Fed’n of Am., PayDay Loan Consumer Information, 
http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/facts.cfm (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).   
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profitability.42  With 25,000 stores producing payday loans, the 
industry generates $6.75 billion annually in fees alone.43  The 
industry reports a return on investment of 24% and gross margins 
of 30% to 45% of annual revenue.44  In comparison, banks that are 
not part of the fringe-banking sector average a 15% return on 
investments.45  Advance America, the largest monoline46 payday 
lender, generated $630 billion in revenue in 2005, a 10.5% increase 
from the previous year.47  Thus, payday loans produce exorbitant 
profit margins for lenders, thereby inducing rapid market growth.48
In Minnesota, the payday lending industry has grown 
significantly.  The industry grew from five companies and $33 
million in loans in 1999 to twenty-four companies and $58 million 
in loans in 2006.
 
49  From 1999 to 2006, Minnesota consumers took 
out about $1 million payday loans for total of more than $215 
million.50
B. Demographics of a Typical Payday Loan Consumer 
 
The payday lending industry intimates that it provides a 
valuable product to astute consumers.51  Industry-sponsored surveys 
claim that more than half of payday loan consumers had family 
incomes between $25,000 and $50,000.52
 
 42. Michael Bertics, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank 
Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 136 (2005). 
 43. KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, THE COST OF CREDIT: 
REGULATION, PREMPTION, AND INDUSTRY ABUSES § 7.5.5.2 (3d ed. 2005). 
 44. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 150 (2004).   
 45. Bertics, supra note 42, at 144–45. 
 46. A monoline payday lender offers only payday loans as opposed to phone 
cards, checking cashing services, and title loans.  BAIR, supra note 30, at 6 n.1. 
 47. Kelly J. Noyes, Note, Get Cash Until Payday! The Payday-Loan Problem in 
Wisconsin, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1627, 1632 (2006) (citing ADVANCE AM., CASH ADVANCE 
CTRS. INC., FORM 10K (ANNUAL REPORT) 47 (Mar. 16, 2006)). 
 48. See Bertics, supra note 42, at 141–42 (analyzing the principles that 
encourage new market entrants). 
 49. H.J. Cummins, Legislators Seek to Curtail ‘Payday Lending’ Practices: The 
Industry Argues that the Proposed Legislation to Limit Interest Rates Would Effectively Put It 
Out of Business, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 24, 2008, at D1 (citing Minnesota 
Department of Commerce data analyzed by the Legal Services Advocacy Project). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 723, 727 (2004). 
  The same surveys stated 
 52. NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC. & CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., THE DEBT 
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that 90% of payday lending consumers had a high school diploma, 
56% had at least some college education, and that a typical payday 
lending consumer was a young female parent.53  Another industry 
study suggested that most payday consumers fell within the lower 
range of $25,000 and $50,000 with 23% reporting incomes of less 
than $25,000.54  Yet another industry source described a typical 
payday loan consumer as “a responsible, hardworking middle class 
American” with an average annual income of $33,000.55  The same 
source claimed that one-third of these consumers owned their 
homes and that they all had regular sources of income.56
Yet, data from non-industry sources demonstrates that the 
payday lenders exploit individuals who lack access to credit 
alternatives or information that would permit comparison 
shopping.
 
57  One survey found that consumers were more often 
than not members of minority groups with a household income of 
less than $25,000.58  They possessed at best a high school or GED 
education, or more often less; were between eighteen and fifty-nine 
years old; and were single females with dependents.59  The same 
survey stated that payday lenders target welfare to work women and 
considered them “a fertile market for payday lenders.”60
 
0Payday%20Loans_Feb02.pdf [hereinafter THE DEBT CYCLE]; OFFICE OF [MO.] 
STATE AUDITOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL, DIV. OF FIN. & REG. OF INSTANT LOAN INDUS., 
PERFORMANCE AUDIT 3 (2001), http://auditor.mo.gov/press/2001-36.pdf. 
 53. THE DEBT CYCLE, supra note 52, at 28–29. 
 54. GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, PH.D. & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, PH.D. CREDIT 
RESEARCH CTR., PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER 
DEMAND 3 (2001), http://www.cfsa.net/downloads/analysis_customer_demand. 
pdf. 
 55. Schaaf, supra note 34, at 348 (quoting Forum on Short-Term High Interest 
Paycheck Advances, U.S. Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, at 2 (Dec. 15, 1999) 
(written testimony of Billy Webster, President, CFSA) (on file with N.C. Banking 
Inst.)). 
 56. Id. at 349. 
 57. Chin, supra note 51, at 727. 
  Another 
 58. JEAN ANN FOX & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & U.S. 
PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING: HOW BANKS HELP 
PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS, THE 2001 PAYDAY LENDER 
SURVEY AND REPORT (2001), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/paydayreport.pdf. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  In 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWOR”), which implemented 
rigorous work requirements for welfare recipients.  Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 
2105 (1996).  The intent of PRWOR was to move welfare recipients from welfare 
to work.  Tammi D. Jackson, Free Social Services: Where Do I Enroll? – The True Cost 
Welfare Recipients and Undocumented Immigrants Have on the U.S. Economy, 13 PUB. 
INT. L. REP. 271, 273 (2008).  Studies have shown that welfare to work women are a 
7
Hayes: A Noose Around the Neck: Preventing Abusive Payday Lending Practi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
2009] PAYDAY LENDING ABUSE 1141 
study showed that racial motivations have spurred the industry’s 
growth.61  This study found that payday lenders were predominantly 
located in lower-income African-American neighborhoods and 
were scarcely represented in white neighborhoods with similar 
income levels.62  Other state surveys found that the average payday 
loan consumer generated an annual income of $25,000.63  
Furthermore, a disproportionate amount of payday lenders operate 
in six states that have a median income level below the national 
median.64
In Minnesota, payday lenders filled the vacuum left by the fifty-
seven bank branches that have disappeared from the Twin Cities 
since 1996.
 
65  In Minnesota, 56% of the payday loans occur in the 
suburbs, with 27% in rural areas of Minnesota and 16% in 
Minneapolis and Saint Paul.66  Moreover, data demonstrates that 
these payday lenders target low-income consumers.67  A Minnesota 
resident has a higher probability of living within a half-mile of a 
payday lender based upon a lower median income level: $15,000: 
88%; $30,000: 73%; $45,000: 50%; $60,000: 27%; $75,000: 12%; 
$90,000: 5%; and $125,000: less than 1%.68
 
particularly vulnerable group.  See, e.g., Maria L. Imperial, Self-Sufficiency and Safety: 
Welfare Reform for Victims of Domestic Violence, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POV. 3, 10 (1997) 
(discussing studies that show over half of the women on welfare-to-work programs 
were victims of domestic abuse). 
 61. URIAH KING ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, RACE MATTERS: THE 
CONCENTRATION OF PAYDAY LENDERS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS IN 
NORTH CAROLINA 2 (2005), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr006-
Race_Matters_Payday_in_NC-0305.pdf. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Johnson, supra note 21, at 99.  Illinois, Wisconsin, and California were 
included in these surveys.  Id. 
 64. Id.  The six states are Kentucky, Missouri, Mississippi, Tennessee, South 
Carolina, and North Carolina.  Id. at 99 n.525.  According to census data, the 
median household income in 2007 in the United States reached $50,233.  Press 
Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, Household Income Rises, Poverty Rate 
Unchanged, Number of Uninsured Down (Aug. 26, 2008), 
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income_wealth/01 
2528.html. 
 65. Nixon et al., supra note 1. 
 66. Cummins, supra note 49 (citing Minnesota Department of Commerce 
data analyzed by the Legal Services Advocacy Project).   
 67. Id. (analyzing census data and data from the Minnesota Department of 
Commerce and Reference USA). 
 68. Id. 
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C. The Troublesome Features of Payday Loans 
1. Triple-Digit Interest Rates 
In addition to exploiting low-income individuals and minority 
groups, payday loans come with additional features that trap 
unwary consumers.  First, payday lenders charge inordinate fees 
that amount to annual percentage rates (“APR”) of 700%.69  For 
example, when a consumer receives a $100 loan and writes a check 
for $115, the $15 fee translates to an APR of 390%.70  A Consumer 
Federation of America (“CFA”) survey of 230 payday lenders in 
1999 found that lenders who made payday loans of $100 to $400 
had interest rates of 390% to 871%.71  Another CFA survey of 235 
payday lenders in 2001 found that one-third of the lenders charged 
an APR greater than 500% for a fourteen-day loan of $100.72  In 
comparison, organized crime loan sharks in Las Vegas give better 
rates.73  They typically charge 5% interest per week, or 260% APR.74
2. The Debt Treadmill 
 
Another feature of payday loans traps consumers in a debt 
treadmill.75  An especially dangerous feature of the payday loan is 
its rollover feature.76  Industry officials claim that rollovers rarely 
occur, with “only a tiny number of transactions result[ing] in more 
than one rollover, of the perhaps 10% of transactions that result in 
any rollovers at all.”77
 
 69.  Elizabeth Renuart & Jean Ann Fox, Payday Loans: A High Cost for a Small 
Loan in Low-Income and Working Communities, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 589, 589 
(2001) (citing data collected by the Colorado and Indiana credit code 
enforcement agencies). 
 70.  Chin, supra note 51, at 728–29. 
 71.  SHOW ME THE MONEY!, supra note 22, at 1.   
 72.  FOX & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 58, at 5. 
 73.  Chin, supra note 51, at 729. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Charles A. Bruch, Comment, Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting 
an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1273–74 (2001) (comparing payday loans and the “debt 
treadmill” to pawnbroking, title pawns, and RTO agreements). 
 76.  Chin, supra note 51, at 729. 
 77.  Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 606 n.91 (quoting testimony from 
Senator Joseph Lieberman’s Forum on Payday Lending that occurred on 
December 15, 1999). 
  Yet, audits conducted by various state 
agencies demonstrate that consumers renewed their loans on 
9
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average ten to twelve times during a twelve-month period.78  A study 
conducted by the Center for Responsible Lending showed that 
payday lenders extend 91% of payday loans to consumers who take 
out five or more loans per year and that the average consumer 
received between eight and thirteen loans each year.79  
Additionally, many consumers use a second payday loan from 
another lender to pay off their first payday loan.80
In Minnesota, a sixty-one-year-old man, Reye DeLowell, turned 
to payday lenders for help even though he worked two jobs as a 
hotel custodian.
 
81  What was meant to be a short, temporary 
solution quickly turned into a long-term insoluble problem.82  
During a three-month period, DeLowell incurred more than $200 
in fees to essentially re-borrow the same $250.83  Thus, despite 
industry assertions to the contrary,84 the payday lenders have every 
incentive to keep consumers in a perpetual cycle of debt, because a 
majority of payday lenders’ revenue is generated from repeat 
transactions.85
3. Coercive Debt Collection Practices 
 
Payday lenders frequently employ coercive techniques and 
intimidate consumers to collect debts.86  Payday lenders threaten to 
pursue civil and criminal remedies under bad-check statutes and 
often collect treble damages and attorneys’ fees in addition to 
regular bounced-check fees.87
 
 78.  KEEST & RENUART, supra note 43, § 7.5.5.4. 
  Despite efforts by states to exempt 
 79.  KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE 
ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 5 tbl. 1, 7 (2004), 
http://responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf. 
 80.  Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter to Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of 
Colorado’s Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 387, 411 (2005). 
 81.  Nixon et al., supra note 1. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  See CMTY. FIN. SERVS. ASS’N OF AM., BEST PRACTICES FOR THE PAYDAY 
ADVANCE INDUSTRY (2008), http://www.moneytreeinc.com/documents/ 
CFSA%20Best%20Practices_Feb08.pdf [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES].  Community 
Financial Services of America, a payday lender lobbying organization, states that 
members of the organization shall not allow a consumer to rollover a loan except 
when expressly authorized by state law.  Id.  Even when states allow rollovers, 
members shall limit a consumer to four rollovers or the state prescribed annual 
limit, whichever is less.  Id. 
 85.  Chessin, supra note 80, at 411; Johnson, supra note 21, at 69–70. 
 86.  Chin, supra note 51, at 732. 
 87.  Bertics, supra note 42, at 140; Johnson, supra note 21, at 77–78. 
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payday-loan consumers from liability under bad-check statutes, 
payday lenders continue to use these statutes to collect on their 
loans.88  For example, a nineteen-year-old woman in Alabama 
found herself in jail after she missed a payment on a $200 payday 
loan.89  The payday lender promised the nineteen-year-old a few 
more days to repay the loan but instead deposited her check; when 
it bounced, he sent a sheriff after her.90
The same coercive techniques occur in Minnesota.  For 
example, one payday lender repeatedly contacted a consumer at 
work in a deliberate attempt to embarrass her.
 
91  The payday lender 
sent two faxes to the senior management office at the consumer’s 
work place.92  The faxes contained a photocopied image of the 
consumer’s check that contained the letters “NSF NSF NSF NSF,” 
which stands for “non-sufficient funds.”93  The fax also included a 
handwritten note that stated, in part, “[g]uess I put trust in the 
wrong people.  Should I begin legal action, or can I trust you to 
begin payments?”94  In violation of Minnesota law,95 the payday 
lender also sent its own form—not the legally authorized form—to 
garnish the consumer’s wages.96
III. MINNESOTA STATE REGULATION OF PAYDAY LENDERS 
 
A. Minnesota Consumer Small Loan Statute 
Legal scholars place states’ regulations of payday lenders into 
three groups.97
 
 88.  MINN. STAT. § 609.535, subdiv. 5 (2008) (stating that penalties of the bad-
check statute do not apply to postdated checks); Johnson, supra note 21, at 80–83 
(discussing Ohio payday lenders who continue to collect treble damages for bad 
checks even though the Ohio legislature has barred the practice). 
 89.  Dean Foust et al., Easy Money: Subprime Lenders Make a Killing Catering to 
Poorer Americans, BUS. WK., Apr. 24, 2000, at 107. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Complaint at 6, Gorecki v. Kwik Cash, No. 07CV02064, 2007 WL 2125572 
(D. Minn. Apr. 26, 2007). 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  MINN. STAT. § 571.72, subdivs. 4, 5, & 7 (2008).  These subdivisions outline 
the procedures and forms needed to garnish a person’s wages.  Id. 
 96. Complaint at 7, Gorecki, 2007 WL 2125572. 
 97. KEEST & RENUART, supra note 43, § 7.5.5.5. 
  The first consists of twelve states as well as the 
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, which have usury statutes that cap 
the interest rate at or around 36%, which effectively bans payday 
11
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lending.98  The second group consists only of New Mexico and 
Wisconsin.99  Lenders in these two states must comply with an 
ineffective small loan law.100  The third category consists of thirty-six 
states along with the District of Columbia that have enacted laws or 
regulations specifically aimed at governing payday loan 
transactions.101  Such regulations, at a minimum, require licensing 
of lenders, disclosures, and limits on the amount of the loan.102
The consumer small loan statute in Minnesota provides several 
substantive provisions that regulate payday lenders.  First, the 
statute mandates licensing and disclosure requirements.
  
Minnesota fits into the third category. 
103
 
 98. Id.  The twelve states are Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, and West Virginia.  Id. at 297 n.479. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
  Second, 
 101. ALA. CODE §§ 5-18-1 to -18 (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2008); ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 6.50.010–.900 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-125 (2008); CAL. FIN. CODE        
§§ 23000–23106 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-3.1-101 to -123 (West 
2002 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2227–2243 (2001 & Supp. 
2006); D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-301 (LexisNexis 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.401 
(West 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480F-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 
2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-46-401 to -413 (2005 & Supp. 2008); 815 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 122/1-1 to 99/99 (West Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.5-7-101 to 
-413 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 533D.1–.16 (West 2001 & 
Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-404 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 286.9-010–
.990 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 9:3578.1 to .8 (Supp. 
2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.2121 (2008); MINN. STAT.                                          
§ 47.60 (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-501 to -539 (2000 & Supp. 2007); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 408.500 (West Supp. 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-701 to -728 
(2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-904 to -929 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 
2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 604A.050 to .850 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A:13 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE      
§§ 13-08-01 to -15 (2004 & Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1315.35 to .99 
(West 2004 & Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 3101–3119 (West Supp. 
2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 725.600–.910 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 19-14.4-1 to -10 (1998 & Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-39-110 to -260 
(Supp. 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 54-4-36 to -66 (2004 & Supp. 2008); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 45-17-101 to -117 (2007 & Supp. 2008) and TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 
0180-28-.01 (2008); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(b) and TEX. FIN. CODE ANN.       
§§ 342.251–.259 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-23-01 to -109 
(2006 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-444 to -471 (West Supp. 2008) and 10 
VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-200-10 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 31.45.010 (West 
2008) and WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 208-630-120 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-14-362 
to -364 (2007). 
 102. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 2005 SUMMARY OF STATE PAYDAY LOAN ACTS 
(Nov. 2005), http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/payday_loans/content/ 
NCLC_SUMMARY.pdf. 
 103. MINN. STAT. § 47.60, subdivs. 3–4 (2008). 
12
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the statute allows, but does not require, a payday lender to offer a 
maximum term of thirty calendar days.104  Third, the statute sets 
limits on finance charges and fees based on the amount of the 
loan.105  Fourth, the statute caps payday loans at $350.106  Fifth, it 
forbids rollovers or concurrent loans in excess of $350.107  Sixth, 
failure to comply with the statute’s requirements constitutes a 
misdemeanor.108  Seventh, the law is enforced by investigating 




While Minnesota’s statute appears strong, it provides marginal 
protection for consumers in practice.110  First, the statute fails to 
protect consumers from the debt treadmill.  The statute prohibits 
rollovers but consumers can pay back one loan and immediately 
take out another.111  Additionally, the statute has no mechanism in 
place to determine whether consumers have any other outstanding 
loans with other payday lenders.112
Another weakness concerns the statute’s enforcement 
procedure, “which is based upon consumer complaints.”
  Thus, consumers could easily 




 104. Id., subdiv. 2(b). 
 105. Id., subdiv. 2(a). 
 106. Id., subdiv. 1(a). 
 107. Id., subdiv. 2(f).  The loan statute states: 
A loan made under this section must not be repaid by the proceeds of 
another loan under this section by the same lender or related interest.  
The proceeds from a loan made under this section must not be applied 
to another loan from the same lender or related interest.  No loan to a 
single borrower made pursuant to this section shall be split or divided 
and no single borrower shall have outstanding more than one loan with 
the result of collecting a higher charge than permitted by this section or 
in an aggregate amount of principal exceed at any one time the 
maximum of $350. 
Id. 
 108. Id., subdiv. 6. 
 109. Id., subdiv. 5. 
 110. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1649 (citing Telephone Interview with Ron 
Elwood, Attorney, Legal Servs. Advocacy Project (Oct. 19, 2005)). 
 111. Nixon et al., supra note 1. 
 112. § 47.60, subdiv. 2(f) (requiring that borrowers only have one payday loan 
but failing to require a duty on lenders to determine whether consumers have 
other outstanding payday loans). 
 113. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1649. 
  The 
13
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Minnesota Department of Banking only audits lenders if a 
complaint has been filed and the Department admittedly receives 
“very few” complaints.114  Consumers typically blame themselves for 
having incurred debt, fail to grasp that the law has been violated, 
and do not file complaints.115
The major flaw in the statute, however, lies in the ease with 
which many payday lenders are able to evade the statute and 
operate outside of it.  Three of the four biggest payday lenders 
operate under Minnesota’s industrial loan and thrift statute.
 
116  
These three lenders account for roughly 70% of the payday loans 
in Minnesota during 2006.117  For example, a $100 loan under the 
consumer small loan statute carries an APR of 391% as opposed to 
a $100 loan under the thrift statute with an APR as high as 685%.118
IV. STRENGTHENING MINNESOTA’S CONSUMER SMALL LOAN 
STATUTE AND DEVELOPING WAYS TO PREVENT ABUSIVE, 
HIGH-RATE PAYDAY LENDERS 
  
Additionally, the statute fails to address the coercive collection 
techniques that accompany payday loans.  Thus, Minnesota’s small 
loan statute as drafted is ineffective. 
A. Strengthening the Minnesota Statute 
Minnesota needs to amend the current statute to prevent the 
most harmful effects of payday loans.  To accomplish this task, the 
Minnesota Legislature should incorporate various parts of the 
AARP Public Policy Institute’s Model Statute,119
First, the legislature should cap the interest rates on payday 
loans at 36% APR.  Fifteen states have already done this, which 
 parts of other state 
laws, and parts of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 
 
 114. Id. (citing Telephone Interview with Ted Ellingson, Review Exam’r, 
Comm’n of Commerce, Minn. Dep’t of Banking (Feb. 27, 2006)). 
 115. Senate Forum on Short-Term, High-Interest Paycheck Advances: Forum Before the 
S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Jean Ann Fox, 
Dir. of Consumer Prot., Consumer Fed’n of Am.) (“They think it’s their fault that 
they’re in debt over their heads and can’t get out, not that some law they never 
heard of has been violated.  So I’m not surprised about the complaints.”). 
 116. Cummins, supra note 49. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. ELIZABETH RENUART, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., PAYDAY LOANS: A MODEL 
STATE STATUTE 1 (2000), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/d16954_ 
payday.pdf. 
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helps eliminate triple-digit interest rates.120  Federal legislation has 
also followed a similar approach.  As payday lenders began to target 
military families, Congress enacted the Talent Amendment, which 
capped payday loan rates at 36% APR to members of the military 
and their families.121
Despite industry assertions, interest rate caps are necessary to 
correct a market failure in the payday loan industry.
 
122  While 
competition has increased between payday lenders, the market has 
failed to produce lower interest rates.123  Studies show that interest 
rates have increased or remained the same despite the industry’s 
growth.124  In states with interest rate caps, a vast majority of the 
payday lenders continue to charge the highest legal interest rate 
permitted.125  Moreover, payday lenders do not compete based on 
price but instead primarily on name recognition, speed, and 
promotions or specials.126  Furthermore, payday lenders frequently 
refuse to disclose the interest rate and other loan terms until after 
the consumer applies for the loan, thereby preventing price 
shopping.127  Thus, capping interest rates as opposed to relying 
upon market pressures will effectively prevent payday lenders from 
charging triple-digit interest rates.128
Additionally, society benefits as a whole from interest rate 
caps.
 
129  Interest rate caps may restrict the availability of credit for 
high-risk consumers and prevent some businesses from entering 
the industry.130
 
 120. KEEST & RENUART, supra note 43, § 7.5.5.5. 
 121. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 109-364, sec. 670, § 987(b), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (to be codified 
at 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006)). 
 122. Johnson, supra note 21, at 117–18; Bertics, supra note 42, at 142–45. 
 123. FOX & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 58, at 13–14. 
 124. Id. at 13. 
 125. Id. at 14; see Chessin, supra note 80, at 408–09 (noting that lenders 
operating under Colorado’s payday loan statute mostly charge the statute’s 
maximum allowable finance charge). 
 126. Bertics, supra note 42, at 143; Diane Hellwig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks 
in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic 
Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1597–98 (2005). 
 127. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1662. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 663–64. 
 130. Id.; see generally George J. Wallace, The Uses of Usury: Low Rate Ceilings 
Reexamined, 56 B.U.L. REV. 451 (1976) (discussing the advantages of, and 
providing ethical support for, low consumer-interest rate ceilings). 
  Yet, creating entry barriers to discourage the 
unscrupulous lenders who focus on a comparatively narrow 
15
Hayes: A Noose Around the Neck: Preventing Abusive Payday Lending Practi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
2009] PAYDAY LENDING ABUSE 1149 
economic base would prevent “reverse redlining” and 
“discriminatory pricing.”131  Additionally, unregulated interest rates 
prevent low-risk consumers from obtaining lower interest rates and 
causes high default rates for high-risk consumers.132  Moreover, 
during periods of recession, households incur a rise in consumer 
debt and an increased exposure to high-rate payday loans, which in 
turn hurts other businesses.133  This is so since the money spent by 
households indebted to high-rate payday loans “is not available for 
spending at the neighborhood grocery stores, service stations, 
pharmacies, or other local businesses.”134  Payday lending 
consumers also constitute a growing share of bankruptcy 
petitioners.135  Bankruptcies hurt other creditors.136  Creating 
interest rate caps would mitigate the effects of high-rate debts.137  
Furthermore, states with interest rate caps at or around 36% for 
payday loans have saved their consumers $1.5 billion while 
preserving a “more responsible small loan market.”138
Second, the legislature must require that payday lenders allow 
consumers to make installment loans at a minimum term of no less 
than two weeks for each $50 owed on the loan.
 
139  A person earning 
$35,000 a year has a difficult time paying back a typical payday loan 
while still meeting basic expenses during one two-week pay 
period.140
 
 131. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 663. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 663–64. 
 134. Id. at 664. 
 135. Robert Mayer, Payday Lending and Personal Bankruptcy, 50 CONSUMER 
INTERESTS ANN. 76, 81 (2004) (noting that in the collected sample, payday loan 
debtors increased in total numbers of personal bankruptcies, but did not 
“outstrip” the general growth in bankruptcies filed in the sample counties from 
2000–2002) [hereinafter Mayer, Payday Lending]; see generally Robert Mayer, One 
Payday, Many Payday Loans: Short-Term Lending Abuse in Milwaukee County, 5–6 
(Loyola Univ. Working Paper 2005), available at 
http://lwvmilwaukee.org/mayer21.pdf (discussing bankruptcy petitioners who 
had pledged their entire next paycheck or more to payday lenders). 
 136. Mayer, Payday Lending, supra note 135, at 81 (noting that debt to benign 
creditors would not be written off due to bankruptcy filings likely caused by 
multiple payday loans). 
 137. Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15 
PEPP. L. REV. 151, 177–78 (1988). 
 138. URIAH KING & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SPRINGING 
THE DEBT TRAP: RATE CAPS ARE ONLY PROVEN PAYDAY LENDING REFORM, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 5 (2007), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/springing-the-debt-
trap-exec-summary.pdf. 
 139. RENUART, supra note 119, at 17. 
 140. KING & PARRISH, supra note 138, at 4. 
  After paying back the payday loan and basic expenses, a 
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person earning $35,000 annually is left with a $112 deficit.141
Third, the legislature needs a more effective prohibition of 
rollovers.  Although rollovers are currently prohibited, Minnesota’s 
small loan statute does not have a cooling-off period.
  Thus, 
requiring payday lenders to allow consumers to make installment 
payments on their loans ensures a better chance of paying off the 
loan rather than defaulting. 
142  A 
consumer can therefore close out the loan and reopen it, creating 
a back-to-back transaction, or essentially a rollover.143  Additionally, 
Minnesota does not require a payday lender to inquire whether the 
consumer has any outstanding payday loans with any other payday 
lenders.144  To prevent rollovers, Minnesota should prohibit payday 
lenders from issuing more than one payday loan to the same 
consumer for at least thirty days.145  A thirty-day cooling-off period 
can prevent subterfuge, like back-to-back transactions.146
Minnesota should also mandate the creation of a real-time 
enforcement database similar to Florida’s database to ensure that 
consumers do not receive more than one payday loan at a time.  In 
Florida, the Department of Banking and Finance partnered with 
Veritec Solutions, a private company, to create a real-time 
database.
 
147  Payday lenders finance the database by paying up to 
one dollar per transaction.148
 
 141. Id. (citing expenditure data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005 
Consumer Expenditure Survey). 
 142. MINN. STAT. § 47.60, subdiv. 2(f) (2008). 
 143. Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the 
Price?, 4 n.10 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), 
available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf_paper_session1_ 
flannery.pdf.  A rollover requires only payment of additional fees, while a renewal 
requires repayment of the loan in full before a new loan is extended.  Id.  
Generally, there is no distinction between these two types of transactions.  Id. 
 144. See § 47.60, subdiv. 2(f) (“A loan made under this section must not be 
repaid by the proceeds of another loan made under this section by the same 
lender or related interest.  The proceeds from a loan made under this section 
must not be applied to another loan from the same lender or related interest.”).  
While providing this directive, the statute never requires the payday lender to 
check for other outstanding loans. 
 145. RENUART, supra note 119, at 22. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(23) (2002); Press Release, Veritec Solutions, 
LLC, The State of Florida Selects Veritec Solutions to Develop and Manage the 
Deferred Presentment Customer Eligibility Verification and Transaction 
Authorization System (Dec. 5, 2001), http://www.veritecs.com/selectveritec12_ 
05_01.htm. 
  A payday lender must check a 
 148. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(23) (2002); FLA. DEP’T OF BANKING & FIN., 
DEFERRED PRESENTMENT PROGRAM, 2002 ANNUAL PROGRAM REPORT TO THE 
17
Hayes: A Noose Around the Neck: Preventing Abusive Payday Lending Practi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
2009] PAYDAY LENDING ABUSE 1151 
consumer’s loan eligibility by entering the consumer’s information 
into a centralized database.149  If the consumer fails to satisfy the 
statutory restrictions, the transaction cannot be completed.150  
Florida’s database compiles data that allows regulatory agencies to 
monitor payday loan activities throughout the state.151  Thus, 
Florida’s database effectively prevents a consumer from being 
issued more than one payday loan at a time and provides regulators 
with valuable information about the payday loan industry.152
Fourth, Minnesota should require payday lenders to determine 
a consumer’s ability to repay loans and restrict the amount that 
consumers can borrow based upon their income.
 
153  Indiana’s 
payday loan statute prohibits lenders from lending more than 20% 
of a consumer’s gross income.154  Limiting the amount consumers 
borrow based on their income prevents them from pledging their 
next paycheck, or more to payday lenders, and decreases the 
probability of default.155  This would burden payday lenders with 
more responsibilities.156  However, requiring payday lenders to 
determine a consumer’s ability to pay back the loan “prevent[s] 
consumers from becoming further overwhelmed by debt.”157
Fifth, Minnesota must prohibit abusive debt collection 
practices by payday lenders.
 
158  The Community Financial Services 
Association of America (“CFSAA”), a lobbying group for payday 
lenders, currently encourages members to “collect past due 
accounts in a professional, fair and lawful manner.”159
 
LEGISLATURE 4 (2003), http://www.veritecs.com/Annualreport.pdf [hereinafter 
DEFERRED PRESENTMENT PROGRAM]. 
 149. See Veritec Solutions, LLC, Applying Business Intelligence to Payday 
Lending Regulatory Solutions, http://www.veritecs.com/PaydaySolution.htm (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2009). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See DEFERRED PRESENTMENT PROGRAM, supra note 148, at 4. 
 153. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1665 (recommending that Wisconsin adopt this 
approach). 
 154. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-7-402(1) (Supp. 2008). 
 155. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1665. 
 156. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 140 (advocating this approach, which is 
already used by mortgage lenders, for enactment at the federal level). 
 157. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1665. 
 158. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 159. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 84. 
  The CFSAA 
also encourages members not to use unlawful threats, intimidation, 
or harassment and to use the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
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(“FDCPA”)160 as a guide when collecting on past due accounts.161
The FDCPA prohibits “any conduct the natural consequence 
of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection 
with the collection of a debt.”
 
162  This includes the threat of or use 
of violence, obscene or profane language, or engaging a person in 
a telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously when 
attempting to collect a debt.163  The FDCPA also prohibits “any 
false, deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with 
the collection of any debt.”164  This section of the FDCPA includes 
an extensive list of prohibited conduct.165  For example, it prohibits 
the “false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of 
any debt,”166 threats to take action that cannot be legally taken,167 or 
the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect 
or attempt to collect any debt.”168  The FDCPA only applies to third-
party debt collectors169 and cannot impose liability against payday 
lenders who collect their own delinquent accounts.170  The 
Minnesota Legislature should incorporate the CFSAA 
recommendations and the above-referenced FDCPA provisions to 
bring to a halt the abusive and coercive methods used by payday 
lenders who collect overdue accounts.171
Sixth, the Minnesota Legislature must create an effective 
enforcement mechanism.  Minnesota legislators should create a 





 160. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006). 
 161. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 84. 
 162. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2006). 
 163. Id. § 1692d(1)–(2), (5). 
 164. Id. § 1692e. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. § 1692e(2)(A). 
 167. Id. § 1692e(5). 
 168. Id. § 1692e(10). 
 169. Id. § 1692a(6). 
 170. Johnson, supra note 21, at 81 (stating that payday lenders ordinarily 
collect their own debt and are therefore not considered “debt collectors” under 
the FDCPA definition); see § 1692a(6)(A) (excluding from liability under the 
FDCPA any officer or employee of a creditor who collects debt in the name of the 
creditor for the creditor). 
 171. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 77–78 (discussing the inappropriate 
collection practices of some payday lenders); supra Part II.C.3; see also Johnson, 
supra note 21, at 92–93 (discussing how even though Ohio law does not permit 
prosecution of payday loan consumers under its bad-check statute, criminal 
prosecutions still occur). 
 172. RENUART, supra note 119, at 23. 
 plus statutory damages up to $1,000 and 
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reasonable attorneys’ fees.173  Currently, Minnesota allows a 
consumer to recover up to $100 for each violation of the consumer 
small loan statute.174  However, Minnesota does not allow for the 
recovery for actual, consequential, or punitive damages; nor does it 
allow for recovery of attorneys’ fees.175  Additionally, Minnesota’s 
enforcement mechanism for violations relies on consumer 
complaints with the Commissioner of Commerce.176  Even if 
consumers filed complaints, enforcement through the 
Commissioner of Commerce may be inadequate given the growth 
of the payday lending industry, and because agencies frequently 
lack sufficient resources to investigate problems and undertake 
enforcement actions.177  Thus, creating a private right of action can 
help assist consumers who have been injured by a violation.178  
Furthermore, a strong enforcement mechanism is essential to 
enforcing these substantive regulations.179
Finally, Minnesota must require that all payday lenders operate 
under the consumer small loan statute.  As of February 2009, only 
fifty-eight payday lending locations held licenses under Minnesota’s 
small loan law.
 
180  Three of the four largest payday lenders in 
Minnesota operate under the industrial loan and thrift statute, 
which allows for higher fees.181
 
 173. The FDCPA allows for the recovery of statutory damages up to $1,000 and 
for the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), (3) 
(2006). 
 174. MINN. STAT. § 56.19, subdiv. 2a (2008) (allowing up to $100 in damages for 
each violation against any lender who intentionally violates the consumer small 
loan statute).  See also MINN. STAT. § 47.60, subdiv. 6 (2008) (imposing liability upon 
others who violate or participate in the violation of any provision of the consumer 
small loan statute in the same manner as in section 56.19). 
 175. See § 56.19, subdiv. 4 (stating that the remedies in section 56.19 are 
exclusive). 
 176. § 47.60, subdiv. 5. 
 177. RENUART, supra note 119, at 23. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Noyes, supra note 47, at 1665–66 (advocating for strong enforcement 
mechanisms for effective legislation). 
  Thus, it is necessary to close this 
loophole to make Minnesota’s consumer small loan statute 
effective.   
 
 180. Minn. Dep’t of Commerce, Small Lender Licensee List, 
http://www.commerce.state.mn.us/FSLicensees/sl.html (last visited Mar. 20, 
2009).   
 181. Cummins, supra note 49.  See Minn. Dep’t of Commerce, Industrial Loan 
List, http://www.commerce.state.mn.us/FSLicensees/il.html (last visited Mar. 20, 
2009). 
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An effective statute requires the Minnesota Legislature to 
enact specific usury limits, prohibit rollovers and concurrent loans, 
and assess a consumer’s ability to repay the loan.  Additionally, an 
effective statute must specifically address collection efforts, provide 
an enforcement mechanism for consumers, and require payday 
lenders to operate under the statute. 
B. Litigation 
Legislation can prevent some of the harmful effects on payday 
lending.  It alone, however, will not suffice.182  Payday lenders 
continuously repackage their products attempting to disguise the 
loans as something other than a payday loan.183
The Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”),
  To help combat 
such evasive maneuvers and limit the effects of payday lenders, 
consumer advocates can utilize current legislation to bring lawsuits 
against payday lenders. 
184 the main federal 
regulation that governs payday lenders,185 provides a useful tool for 
combating payday lenders in the courtroom.  Congress enacted 
TILA in 1968 to increase consumers’ awareness of the cost of 
credit.186  The purpose was to “assure a meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more 
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the 
uninformed use of credit.”187
Payday lenders are bound by TILA’s disclosure requirements 




 182. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1666. 
 183. Erick Bergquist, Credit Line Is Key in Pa. Payday Twist, AM. BANKER, June 23, 
2006, at 1.  Advance America was no longer able to make payday loans in 
Pennsylvania, so the company started offering open-credit lines for up to $500 that 
charged a monthly participation fee of $149.95, plus principal and interest 
payments.  Id. 
 184. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67 (2006). 
 185. Johnson, supra note 21, at 13.  The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) also governs payday lenders.  18 U.S.C §§ 1961–68 
(2006).  Passed by Congress in 1970, RICO is the other key federal law that affects 
the payday lending industry.  Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006)).  
RICO prohibits lenders from providing credit at a usurious rate, or twice the legal 
interest rate.  Id. § 1961(6).  RICO allows the government to bring criminal 
charges against payday lenders for RICO violations.  Id. § 1963. 
 186. Johnson, supra note 21, at 13–14. 
 187. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006). 
 188. Johnson, supra note 21, at 14. 
  
Despite the plain language, payday lenders originally claimed to be 
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exempt from TILA requirements.189  Payday lenders argued that 
they provide a service for a set fee and were therefore not required 
to comply with TILA.190  The courts191 and the Federal Reserve 
Board,192
TILA’s remedial measures compensate consumers in the form 
of statutory and actual damages for violations of TILA’s disclosure 
requirements.
 however, ruled that payday loans are consumer credit. 
193  Once a disclosure violation is established under 
TILA, statutory damages are automatically available regardless as to 
whether an actual injury has occurred.194  Statutory damages are 
twice the amount of any finance charge in the particular 
transaction.195  Conversely, actual damages are only available for 
actual compensatory injuries incurred by the violation.196
TILA’s disclosure requirements are meticulously specific.
 
197  
Violations occur for using the wrong typeface for a financing 
term,198 or for failing to provide documents at the proper time 
during the loan transaction.199  TILA also allows for class action 
lawsuits.200  Thus, the ease for which TILA can be violated provides 
consumers with an important tool against payday lenders who run 
afoul of the disclosure requirements.201
 
 189. Id. at 16.  Payday lenders originally claimed they were not bound by TILA 
because they were check-cashing services.  Id.  See generally Deborah A. 
Schmedemann, Time and Money: One State’s Regulation of Check-Based Loans, 27 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 973, 976 (2000) (discussing the difference between check-
cashing services and payday loans). 
 190. Bruch, supra note 75, at 1274–75. 
 191. See, e.g., Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1382 
(S.D. Ga. 2000); Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, Tenn., Inc., 35 F. 
Supp. 2d 1042, 1048 (M.D. Tenn. 1999). 
 192. Johnson, supra note 21, at 38. 
 193. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 194. Id. § 1640(a)(2)(A). 
 195. Id. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 196. Id. § 1640(a)(1).  It is more difficult to prove actual injury and receive 
damages compared to statutory damages under a violation of TILA’s disclosure 
requirements.  See Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. & John L. Ropiequet, Actual Damages Under 
the TILA: Collapsing Class Actions, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 200, 200 (2001). 
 197. Thomas A. Wilson, The Availability of Statutory Damages Under TILA to 
Remedy the Sharp Practice of Payday Lenders, 7 N. C. BANKING INST. 339, 344 (2003). 
 198. Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 199. Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121, 124–25 (W.D. 
Mich. 2002). 
 200. § 1640(a)(2)(B). 
 
 201. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 989–90; see Ann Hayes Peterson, 
Payday Loans, CREDIT UNION MAG., Dec. 2000, at 57 (noting how payday lenders do 
not follow TILA because they believe it does not apply to their business practices); 
see, e.g., Kilbourn, 209 F.R.D. at 124–25 (regarding a class action against a financier 
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Yet, TILA does have its shortcomings.  The court in Brown v. 
Payday Check Advance, Inc. limited statutory damages for only 
violations of the paragraphs enumerated by section 1640(a)(4).202  
The court held that statutory damages are available “only for failing 
to comply with the requirements of section 1635 of [TILA] or of 
paragraph (2) (insofar as it requires a disclosure of the ‘amount 
financed’), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (9) of section 1638(a) of 
[TILA].”203  The Eighth Circuit has reached the same conclusion.204  
Statutory damages are automatic, as opposed to actual damages, 
which are harder to prove.205
For example, in Van Jackson v. Check ‘N Go of Illinois, Inc., the 
plaintiffs successfully litigated a class action lawsuit against a payday 
lender because the lender failed to disclose the check as a security 
interest.
  Nonetheless, a consumer can use 
TILA to his advantage. 
206  A postdated check, which payday lenders frequently use 
to secure the payday loan, is required to be disclosed as a security 
interest.207  TILA requires a lender, when credit is secured, to 
provide a statement that a security interest had been taken in 
property not purchased as part of the credit transaction.208
In Van Jackson, the defendant’s disclosure regarding the check 
as a security interest was not grouped together with the other 
required disclosures.
 
209  Instead the disclosure was placed on the 
back of the consumer loan agreement in small type under a 
heading entitled “Method of Payment.”210
 
of  automobiles). 
 202. 202 F.3d at 989.  Payday Check Advance is the first case concerning payday 
loans and statutory damages under TILA. 
 203. Id. at 991 (emphasis added). 
 204. See e.g., Malchow v. GMI Acquisitions, Inc., Civ. No. 01-1662, 2002 WL 
31185865, at *3–5 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2002); Peter v. Village Imports Co., Civ. No. 
01-12, 2001 WL 1640130, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2001); Wojcik v. Courtesy Auto 
Sales, Inc., No. 8:01CV506, 2002 WL 31663298, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 25, 2002). 
 205. Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 196, at 200. 
 206. 123 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1080–81 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (granting plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment and awarding statutory damages). 
 207. Id. at 1083 (holding that a check is a security interest under 15 U.S.C 
section 1638(a)(9)).  See Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt., Inc., 195 F.3d 325, 331 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that a check is a security for a loan). 
 208. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(9) (2006).  See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(m) (2008) 
(stating that a security interest must be disclosed in other property and indentified 
by item or type). 
 209. All disclosures required by federal law must be grouped together and 
conspicuously segregated from other information.  § 1638(b)(1). 
 210. Van Jackson v. Check ‘N Go of Illinois, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 544, 548 (N.D. Ill. 
2000).  The disclosure read as follows: 
  The court held that the 
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defendant failed to comply with section 1638(a)(9) because the 
security interest disclosure was not accessible to an average person 
and was hidden among other material in fine print underneath the 
“Method of Payment” heading.211  Thus, if a consumer can establish 
that a payday lender did not make the disclosures enumerated 
under section 1638(a)(9) accessible to an average person, that 
consumer can be awarded statutory damages pursuant to section 
1640(a)(4).212
C. Market Pressure 
 
An increase in the number of payday lenders has failed to 
decrease the costs of payday loans.213  Increased competition from 
banks and credit unions in the payday loan market, however, could 
decrease prices and create more options for consumers.214  A 2005 
study found that banks and credit unions could provide lower-cost, 
small-dollar credit products compared to payday lenders.215  Banks 
and credit unions can provide lower-cost alternatives because they 
have a preexisting infrastructure that helps minimize operational 
costs.216  Banks and credit unions already have the facilities, loan 
staff, and collection processes in place.217
 
You may prepay this contract in full at any time.  In accordance with the 
Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. Section 1615) and the Illinois 
Consumer Installment Loan Act (205 ILCS 670/15), if you pay off this 
loan you shall be entitled to a refund of the unearned portion of the 
Finance Charge, unless that refund would be less than $1.00.  The refund 
will be calculated in accordance with the method required by the Truth 
in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. Section 1615) and by the Illinois Consumer 
Installment Loan Act (205 ILCS 670/15).  Upon determination of the 
amount owed based on your prepayment of the loan, we will return your  
check, which was used as security for the loan, and request from you of  
the amount due as revised in accordance with you prepayment. 
Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See U.S. v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir. 1999).  The 
meaning of “disclosure” is “opening up to view, revelation, discovery, exposure.”  
Id. (citing 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 738 (2d ed. 1989)); see also Basham v. 
Fin. Am. Corp., 583 F.2d 918, 926 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that disclosures must 
follow a logical order and not be scattered throughout an agreement). 
 213. See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text. 
 214. Bertics, supra note 42, at 149–50 (arguing that banks should compete with 
payday lenders). 
 215. BAIR, supra note 30, at 28–29. 
 216. Id. at 28. 
 217. Id. 
  Banks and credit unions 
also have an established consumer base, which minimizes 
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marketing costs.218  Banks and credit unions can market small-loan 
products through preexisting channels, such as inserts in account 
statements.219  Conversely, payday lenders must set up stores, recruit 
staff, and use mass media to advertise.220
Banks and credit unions can also provide lower-cost 
alternatives because they can minimize losses by using direct 
deposit and automatic deductions for repayment.
 
221  When a 
payday lender cashes a consumer’s postdated check, the lender’s 
check waits in line behind other withdrawals that occurred before 
the payday lender attempted to cash the consumer’s postdated 
check.222  Unlike payday lenders, banks and credit unions can make 
a priority claim on checking account funds to ensure their loan is 
paid.223  Additionally, banks and credit unions derive their income 
from a variety of products and services.  Banks and credit unions 
are therefore in an overall better position to provide small loans at 
a lower cost than payday lenders.224
Nevertheless, banks and credit unions have traditionally shied 
away from offering payday loans.
 
225  Bank officials consider payday 
loans to be high-risk products that require extremely high interest 
rates to maintain profitability.226  Such loans would tarnish the bank 
and credit union’s image in the community.227  Banks are also 
reluctant to enter the payday loan market due to a perceived 
regulatory animosity toward partnerships involving federally 
regulated banks and payday lenders.228  However, this perception 
appears to be misguided.229  Informally, bank regulators have 
“agreed that banks and credit unions should be encouraged to 
develop low-cost small dollar credit products” for consumers.230
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 10. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
  
Furthermore, developing low-cost payday loans can help banks and 
credit unions earn credit under the Community Reinvestment Act, 
which requires financial institutions to meet their communities’ 
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credit needs.231
Moreover, credit unions have developed successful and 
profitable payday loan programs.
 
232  In 2001, the North Carolina 
State Employees’ Credit Union (“NCSECU”) began offering a 
revolving loan with a maximum balance of $500 and an APR of 
12%.233  The loan must be repaid in full on the consumer’s next 
payday by automatic deduction.234  The charge for a $500, two-week 
loan is less than $2.50.235  An applicant must have direct deposit 
into their credit union account to qualify.236  An important feature 
of the account is that it requires the consumer to put 5% of each 
advance in a savings account.237  Access to the product is unlimited, 
but if the consumer withdraws the savings, he cannot access the 
product for six months.238
The program has made a total of $305,405,278 in loans and 
has generated $1,919,097 in interest income.  Roughly 40,000 
members use the product and about 70% use the product once a 
month.  Recurrent use, from a public policy standpoint, is less 
problematic if the rate charged is comparable or less than a credit 
card.
   
239  Additionally, NCSECU officials hope that over time, the 
mandatory savings will decrease the consumer’s reliance on the 
product.240  In less than eighteen months, the savings component 
has resulted in more than $6 million in new deposits for 
NCSECU.241





 231. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a) (2000).  Higher favorable ratings under the 
Community Reinvestment Act lead to fewer evaluations.  See Chin, supra note 51, at 
750. 
 232. BAIR, supra note 30, at 21–22.   
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 22. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 23. 
  ASI Federal Credit Union, a $200 million asset low-
income community development credit union located in an 
economically distressed area of New Orleans, began offering $500 
lines of credit at a 12% interest rate in 2002 along with other 
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financial services.243  The line of credit has a flat fee of $4 a week.244  
With nearly 8,000 lines of credit issued in 2004, the product has 
been popular and profitable.245  In 2003, the line of credit 
generated $947,000 in fees and $1,046,000 in 2004.246
Providing small-loan alternatives can also help consumers 
build a credit history so that they may qualify for larger, more 
profitable loans in the future.
 
247  Banks and credit unions could 
therefore remain profitable and compete with payday lenders; 
offering lower prices could decrease the demand for high-cost 
payday loans and force payday lenders to decide between offering 
better terms or going out of business.248
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The payday loan industry is one more manifestation of various 
short-term lending schemes that have plagued this country 
throughout the past century by exploiting desperate, cash-strapped 
consumers.249  This exploitation of low-income consumers not only 
harms the consumer, it also places a needless drag on the 
economy.250  The current lending crisis, which began in 2007 and 
has led to the collapse of several major American financial 
institutions, illustrates the need to curb abusive lending practices.251
 
 243. Id. at 23–24.  ASI Federal Credit Union’s financial package also includes a 
ten-minute phone card, free travelers checks, a free refund anticipation loan, and 
twenty-five-cent money orders.  Id. at 23. 
 244. Id. at 23. 
 245. Id. at 24. 
 246. Id.   
 247. Id. at 26. 
 248. See Bertics, supra note 42, at 149–50 (discussing banks’ and credit unions’ 
ability to offer payday loans and force payday lenders to offer lower prices). 
 249. Bruch, supra note 75, at 1287. 
  
As credit tightens and our economy suffers in the current 
recession, more consumers will continue to turn to payday loans.  
The prevention of abusive lending practices and the promotion of 
responsible lending not only benefits the economy but also the 
impacted communities.  The recommendations in this article can 
both prevent abusive payday lending practices in Minnesota and 
serve as a guide for other states.  Low-income consumers who live 
 250. CONSUMERS UNION, THE NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER FED’N OF 
AM., SMALL DOLLAR LOAN PRODUCTS, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCORECARD 3 (2008), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/small_loan_scorecard_08.pdf. 
 251. See id. at 4 (discussing how stronger consumer protection guidelines 
could have prevented the subprime mortgage lending crisis). 
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paycheck to paycheck will at times have to rely on payday loans to 
help manage unexpected expenses.  However, payday loans do not 
have to become a noose around the neck of such consumers. 
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